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As I contemplated the focus of this conference, issues about the 
nature of the rights that are the subject of a deal stood out to me. A 
good deal of my recent work has focused on challenges in 
determining the scope of IP rights. And since those rights are the 
inputs to various kinds of transactions—or, perhaps even more 
importantly, ability to assess the scope of a right affects whether a 
transaction is needed—I’m going to focus here on the relationship 
between the scope of IP rights and potential IP transactions.  
There is already quite a bit of scholarship on the importance of 
clarity of property rights, both in giving notice to others as to how 
to avoid the rights and in helping structure transactions. For 
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example, Henry Smith has emphasized the importance of 
standardized forms of property,1 and Mike Meurer and Jim Bessen 
have argued that the social value of patents is a function of the clarity 
of the property rights.2 My colleague Steve Yelderman has written 
about the value of accuracy in the patent system—and particularly 
its relation to incentives.3 But it’s notable that this literature focuses 
primarily—perhaps even overwhelmingly—on utility patent law, 
particularly patent claim scope,4 as evidenced by the extensive 
literature on patent claim construction.5  
I’m going to suggest that the problem may be more pervasive 
than people have thought, in part because there generally has not 
been enough focus on claiming outside of utility patent,6 or on 
problems relating to scope. So I will focus here on two related 
dimensions of the problem: (1) disparate claiming methodologies 
across areas of intellectual property (IP); and (2) the ways our legal 
system determines and enforces the scope of a party’s rights. I’m 
going to address these in the context of design. I don’t do that 
because I think it’s the only context in which these issues arise, but 
because the problems may be the worst there, and because there are 
some particular features of our legal treatment of design that 
combine to exacerbate the problems.  
                                                                                                             
1 See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property:  Delineating 
Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742 (2007). 
2 See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: 
HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008). 
3 Stephen Yelderman, The Value of Accuracy in the Patent System, 84 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1217 (2017). 
4 See, e.g., Janet Freilich, The Uninformed Topography of Patent Scope, 19 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 150, 152–53 (2015); Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, 
Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 106 (1990); Paul 
Klemperer, How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J. 
ECON. 113 (1990); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex 
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990).  
5 See, e.g., Dan Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? 
Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743 (2009); Timothy 
R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779, 809 
(2011); Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 
MICH L. REV. 101, 119–21 (2005). 
6 Jeanne Fromer’s excellent work is the obvious exception here. See Jeanne 
C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (2009). 
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What makes design such a unique and important context for 
discussion is that it is highly unusual in the extent of overlapping 
protection. Obviously, I don’t mean that it’s the only subject matter 
that implicates multiple forms of intellectual property protection. 
But design is unusual, if not absolutely unique, because in most of 
the other contexts of overlapping protection, different IP regimes 
deal with different aspects of a product. To take the example of 
software—utility  patent deals with the functional aspects, while 
copyright deals with the non-functional, expressive aspects of the 
code.7 As much of Pam Samuelson’s work has shown, that division 
between the functional and non-functional isn’t always perfect, just 
as the distinctions are not perfect in any of the contexts in which 
different rights might apply to different aspects of the same 
commercial product.8 But in all of those other contexts, courts have 
developed substantial doctrine that aims to channel protection of 
particular aspects of the work to the right regime.9  
Design is different. It is relatively common for parties to claim 
multiple forms of legal protection, not for different parts, but for 
exactly the same features of a design.10 Indeed, complaints regularly 
allege both design patent infringement and trade dress infringement 
based on copying of the exact same features.11 In light of the 
                                                                                                             
7 Dennis S. Karjala, The Relative Roles of Patent and Copyright in the 
Protection of Computer Programs, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 41, 
41–42 (1998). 
8 For a thorough discussion of the respective roles of utility patent and 
copyright in the software context, see Pamela Samuelson, Functionality and 
Expression in Computer Programs:  Refining the Tests for Software Copyright 
Infringement, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1215 (2017). See also Pamela 
Samuelson, Strategies for Discerning the Boundaries of Copyright and Patent 
Protections, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493 (2017). 
9 See Mark P. McKenna & Katherine J. Strandburg, Progress and 
Competition in Design, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2014) (describing IP law’s 
utility patent supremacy principle, by which IP law tries to channel functional 
features to utility patent law).  
10 Or at least probably the same features—given different claiming 
methodologies, it’s often hard to tell. See Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark P. McKenna, 
Claiming Design, 167 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).   
11 See e.g., Jenny Yoo Collection, Inc. v. David's Bridal, Inc., 1:16 –cv–02647 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2016) (alleging trade dress and design patent infringement in 
designs of convertible bridesmaid’s dresses); Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. J.C. 
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Supreme Court’s recent Star Athletica decision,12 I suspect we are 
going to see copyright asserted much more frequently as well. In 
fact, just after Star Athletica was decided, Puma filed a lawsuit 
against Forever 21 over these “Bow Slides”—alleging design 
patent, trade dress, and copyright infringement.13  
 
Figure 1: Image Comparison of Puma’s “Bow Slide” Slipper to 
Forever 21’s “Bow Slide” Slipper. 
 
Each of those areas of law—design patent, trademark, and 
copyright—makes some effort to channel protection of the 
functional features of design to utility patent. But beyond that, our 
IP system is largely comfortable with overlapping protection for the 
nonfunctional aspects of design. That overlap, as Jeanne Fromer and 
I discuss in a current project,14 means that strategic parties can use 
different forms of IP additively or as substitutes for each other—and 
they can do so much more effectively than can parties claiming 
                                                                                                             
Penney Co. Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1181 (C.D. Cal. 2014). Courts have explicitly 
endorsed these overlapping claims. See Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 
638 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[A] product's different qualities can be protected 
simultaneously, or successively, by more than one of the statutory means for 
protection of intellectual property.”).  
12 Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017). 
13 Puma SE v. Forever 21, Inc., No. 2:17–cv–02523 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2017). 
14 Fromer & McKenna, supra note 10.  
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rights in just about any other subject matter.  
One reason courts have not been able to manage that overlap 
effectively is that the claiming methodologies of design patent, 
trademark, and copyright differ significantly. In fact, there are some 
pervasive issues with design claiming that complicate application of 
design patent, trademark, and copyright doctrines and make it very 
difficult for others to evaluate the scope of a party’s claims relating 
to a design. These claiming problems also make it harder for courts 
to give valid rights the correct scope—which is in turn made worse 
by the way courts tend to structure their approach to validity and 
infringement. As Mike Madison would say, all of these areas of law 
struggle to identify and delineate the boundaries of the relevant legal 
thing.15 
 
I. CLAIMING METHODOLOGY16 
 
Let me begin by talking about three issues relating to claiming 
methodology in design patent, trademark and copyright: (1) 
differences in the timing of the claims; (2) differences in the format 
of the claims, and particularly the relative emphasis on visual and 
verbal identification of the claimed features; and (3) a pervasive 
level of abstraction problem. 
 
A.  Design Patent 
 
Like utility patents, design patents do not exist until the Patent 
Office issues them. Design patent claims are submitted to the Patent 
Office as part of the application, independent of a dispute with any 
alleged infringer. That means that, while claiming is strategic in the 
sense that applicants draft claims with an eye toward the anticipated 
conduct of other market participants, they generally cannot draft 
those claims in reaction to a particular third-party use. Once issued, 
a design patent provides a “definitive” record of a party’s claim 
which, at least in theory, binds the party in all assertions of rights. 
                                                                                                             
15 See Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts and Digital 
Things, 56 CASE WESTERN L. REV. 381 (2005).  
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Notably, design patent claims are visual.17 At the Patent Office, 
they are usually only visual; applicants can include some textual 
material that explains or limits the claim, but the claim itself is an 
image.18 Because a design patent can only issue for the design of an 
article of manufacture, but a party need not claim the design of the 
entire article, parties use solid lines to identify claimed features and 
dotted lines to indicate the portions that are not claimed and depicted 
only for context.19  That means, of course, that reading a design 
patent entails visual interpretation.  
 
 
  Figure 2: Design Patent D599,999. 
 
Visual interpretation remains important, at least formally, when 
courts are evaluating validity and/or infringement, though there is 
an interesting and important outlier here, namely nonobviousness, 
where the Federal Circuit explicitly requires courts to render the 
                                                                                                             
17 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 1502 (9th ed. 7th rev., Nov. 2015) [hereinafter MPEP] (“The design 
for an article consists of the visual characteristics embodied in or applied to an 
article.”). 
18 37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a) (2012).  
19 MPEP, supra note 17, at § 1503.2, ¶ 15.49 (“The two most common uses 
of broken lines are to disclose the environment related to the claimed design and 
to define the bounds of the claim. Structure that is not part of the claimed design, 
but is considered necessary to show the environment in which the design is 
associated, may be represented in the drawing by broken lines.”) 
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claimed design verbally in order to compare it to prior art.20 
Apparently that comparison can be done perfectly well without 
verbal elaboration when the issue is novelty, but not in the context 
of nonobviousness.21  
Courts in design patent cases emphasize the visual because of 
their concern that deconstruction and verbal description will 
inevitably focus decisionmakers too much on  individual features 
rather than the overall creativity of a composite design.22 That 
concern is not unique to design patent law, of course – we see it in 
the “overall look and feel” cases in copyright,23 and as we’ll see, the 
issue arises in trademark law too.24 Concern for the overall design 
pushes courts to give visual representation priority.  
But it turns out to be essentially impossible to maintain that 
exclusive focus on visual claims, because drawings actually don’t 
speak for themselves when designs must be compared to prior art or 
allegedly infringing products, and when courts have to give reasons 
for their determinations about whether those comparators are 
sufficiently similar to the claimed design to meet the legal standard. 
As a result, notwithstanding their repeated insistence that the visual 
takes priority, courts can’t resist describing the designs verbally.  
One important reason for the persistence of verbal description is 
that designs often include features or collections of features that, 
standing alone, wouldn’t be protectable – because they are not new, 
                                                                                                             
20 See High Point Design LLC v. Buyers Direct, Inc., 730 F.3d 1301 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013). 
21 Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, The Eye Alone Is the Judge: Images and Design 
Patents, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 409 (2012) (critiquing translation of images to 
verbal descriptions). 
22 See Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (“Depictions of the claimed design in words can easily distract from the 
proper infringement analysis of the ornamental patterns and drawings.”); see also 
Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 679–80 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
23 See, e.g., Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 
338 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Essentially, the total-concept-and-feel locution 
functions as a reminder that, while the infringement analysis must begin by 
dissecting the copyrighted work into its component parts in order to clarify 
precisely what is not original, infringement analysis is not simply a matter of 
ascertaining similarity between components viewed in isolation.”); see also Roth 
Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970). 
24 See infra Part I.B. 
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or because they are functional. Those design features are only 
protectable when used in the particular overall design, and the risk 
of gestalt comparison is that infringement might be found based on 
similarity that is attributable only to the unprotectable parts.25 Courts 
are aware of that problem, and as a result, validity decisions—those 
dealing with ornamentality, novelty, and of course 
nonobviousness—nearly always include verbal descriptions, even if 
not acknowledged as such.  
International Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens provides just 
one example.26 In that case, the court compared the claimed design 





Figure 3: Image Comparison of the ‘263 Patent to the Prior Art 
Design in the ‘789 Patent. 
 
In doing so, the court could not help but to highlight the long, 
U-shaped dimpling pattern on the insole of the design in the ‘789 
patent, which it contrasted with the multiple short rows of dimples 
depicted in the ‘263 patent.27 That difference, it believed, might be 
                                                                                                             
25 See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 2197, 2206–07 (2016).  
26 589 F.3d 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
27 Id. at 1242–43. 
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significant in the eyes of the ordinary observer armed with the 
knowledge of the prior art. By contrast, the court was confident that 
slight variations in the number and position of the circular holes on 
the top of the respective shoes, differences in the rectangular holes 
on the toes of the shoes, and differences in the shapes of the 
rectangles on the soles of the shoes were all so minor that they 
wouldn’t have had any effect on the ordinary observer.28 
Comparisons are particularly difficult in the infringement 
context because they necessarily entail comparison of an accused 
product—typically a physical object—with the patent drawing, 
which might claim only partially. Because comparing a real object 
to a drawing is not comparing like to like, interpretation is inherently 
necessary. Obviously that challenge can sometimes arise in novelty 
and obviousness comparisons, but it does not always do so, since 
the universe of prior art includes prior patents and publications.29  
To help with the infringement comparison, courts used to line 
up the accused product, the claimed design, and the closest prior art 
in order to identify the point of novelty in the claimed design—the 
feature or features that made the design patentable over the prior 
art.30 The point was to assure that the accused design was similar to 
the patented design in terms of those features. So rather than simply 
looking at the accused design side by side with the patented design, 
as in Figure 4, one could have some context against which to 
evaluate elements of similarity, as in Figure 5. 
                                                                                                             
28 Id. at 1243. 
29 MPEP, supra note 17, at § 1501(a)(1) (“Prior art consisting of patents or 
printed publications which the person making the submission believes to have a 
bearing on the patentability of any claim of the patent . . .”). 
30 See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 527 (Fed. Cir. 
1987); see also Applied Arts Corp. v. Grand Rapids Metalcraft Corp., 67 F.2d 
428, 430 (6th Cir. 1933). 
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Figure 4: Image Comparison of Defendant’s Nebelli Bench Design 
to Plaintiff’s Design Patent D523,263.31 
 
 
Figure 5: Image Comparison of Defendant’s Nebelli Bench to 
Plaintiff’s Design Patent D523,263 and Prior Art design 
D419,341.32 
 
Sometimes that three-way comparison served to highlight 
particular similarities, as in the bench example. Often, however, a 
three-way comparison drew out dissimilarities or highlighted the 
fact that the similarities were only with respect to common, 
unprotectable elements.  
  
                                                                                                             
31 Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., No. CIV.A. MJG–06–2662, 
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Figure 6: Image Comparison from Coca-Cola Co. v. Whistle Co. of 
America, 20 F.2d 955, 957 (D. Del. 1927). 
 
But we no longer use this point of novelty approach, nor do we 
explicitly require a comparison with the closest piece of prior art. 
While the infringement comparison is still supposed to be made in 
light of the prior art, post-Egyptian Goddess, courts are no longer to 
identify and describe the point of novelty.33 They are instead just 
                                                                                                             
33 See Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“Our rejection of the point of novelty test does not mean, of course, that the 
differences between the claimed design and prior art designs are irrelevant. To the 
contrary, examining the novel features of the claimed design can be an important 
component of the comparison of the claimed design with the accused design and 
the prior art. But the comparison of the designs, including the examination of any 
novel features, must be conducted as part of the ordinary observer test, not as part 
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supposed to assume that the decisionmaker will notice differences 
between the claimed design and the prior art and take them into 
account. 
Nevertheless, even in infringement cases, unless we are to throw 
the comparison entirely to a jury and not require any stated reasons 
for the similarity determination, it shouldn’t be a surprise that we 
still see lots of verbal articulation of a claimed design, and 
descriptions of the similarities and differences between the accused 
product and that claimed design.34 Indeed, Egyptian Goddess gives 
courts continuing discretion to use verbal description if they think it 
would be helpful.35  But there is an enormous level of generality 
problem here, in significant part because courts exercise that 
discretion in the shadow of a rule that formally warns them away 
from doing verbal description at all. Courts engaged in the practice 
of verbally describing things that they purport not to be describing 
do so at quite different levels of generality, a problem of which the 
Federal Circuit  essentially washed its hands when it held that the 
level of generality is a matter of discretion.36 Sometimes the Federal 
Circuit determines that district courts’ verbal comparisons operate 
at too high a level of abstraction, failing to highlight the design 
elements,37 but other times equally or more abstract descriptions 
seem fine.38 Without any methodology for determining the 
appropriate level of generality, it’s very difficult to know how to 
evaluate similarities or differences in any systematic way.  
To summarize, design patent claiming has the virtue of early 
claiming independent of a dispute, giving at least the sense of a 
stable public record. But the claiming is in the form of images. 
Images in general—and even more these kinds of images in 
particular—beg courts for description in order to do comparison. 
When courts have to make comparisons for validity or infringement 
purposes, it turns out that verbal description is inevitable. Yet these 
                                                                                                             
of a separate test focusing on particular points of novelty that are designated only 
in the course of litigation.”). 
34 See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1328–33 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012).  
35 Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 679. 
36 Id. 
37 See, e.g., Apple, 678 F.3d at 1328–33 
38 See, e.g., MRC Innovations, Inc. v. Hunter Mfg., LLP, 747 F.3d 1326, 
1332–36 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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descriptions are wildly inconsistent and lacking in any clear 
methodology. The notice value of the ex ante design patent claim is 
actually quite questionable.  
In a world with an extremely tight infringement standard, and 
particularly one in which functionality plays a significant limiting 
role, that might not be a significant problem. But, in my judgment, 
the infringement standard has broadened over time to the point that 
I don’t think it can be said anymore in the context of design patent 
that “that which infringes, if it later, anticipates if earlier.”39 And I 
think the Federal Circuit has largely eliminated functionality as a 
constraint.40 
 
B.  Trademark 
 
In the trademark context, we formally have a dual regime with 
registered and unregistered marks.41 Registered marks appear to 
share with design patents the fact that they have a definitive claim 
made prior to, and independent of, any particular dispute. The 
Trademark Office has pretty elaborate rules about the form in which 
the mark is to be depicted—often requiring verbal elaboration of the 
design elements of the mark in addition to the description of goods 
and services.42  
But that really overstates things in a couple of important ways. 
First, most trade dress—particularly of the product configuration 
variety—is not registered, so any notice value a registration might 
provide is lacking, at least in most litigated cases. And second, the 
form of the registration really doesn’t matter in the context of a 
dispute; courts focus overwhelmingly on the nature of the parties’ 
uses in the marketplace.43 As a result, registration provides only a 
weak form of notice.  
                                                                                                             
39 Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1239 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (quoting Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889)).  
40 See, e.g., Sport Dimension, Inc. v. Coleman Co., Inc., 820 F.3d 1316, 
1320–21 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
41 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–52 (2012) (providing for registration of marks and 
grounds for refusal of registration); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (providing causes of 
action for registered and unregistered marks, respectively). 
42 See MPEP, supra note 17, at §§ 807–809.  
43 See Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in Modern 
American Trademark Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 867, 907 (2017). 
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Of course, in many cases involving registered marks, and even 
in cases involving unregistered marks, the claimant has used the 
design in the market, and that use itself provides some bit of notice. 
Particularly in the context of product configuration, however, use-
based notice is very poor because these complex designs include a 
number of features which are not themselves protectable. And trade 
dress often changes over time, forcing parties to identify the features 
that remain consistent and therefore potentially protectable. 
Courts understandably are uncomfortable about allowing parties 
simply to refer to their trade dress or even just to depict it, and most 
courts now require—often as a matter of pleading—that a trade 
dress claimant verbally describe the claimed trade dress so as to 
identify the features.44  It’s worth noting here that courts have done 
this only in trade dress cases, even though one might have the same 
notice concerns much more broadly—especially when it comes to 
other visual matter that isn’t trade dress. But perhaps because trade 
dress highlights the risk of functionality, courts are more sensitive 
to this issue here. 
In any event, at least as implemented now, this verbal 
description requirement doesn’t work very well. The most basic 
issue is the level of generality problem. Even when courts require 
parties to describe the trade dress verbally, there is no agreement, 
and certainly no consistent practice, as to the level of generality at 
which they require the trade dress to be described. Thus in 
                                                                                                             
44 See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405, 415 (6th 
Cir. 2006) (“In requiring a list of discrete elements, we are looking to avoid vague 
and indeterminate references to the overall appearance or look of plaintiff ’s 
packaging.”); Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 116–17 (2d Cir. 
2001) (“[W]e hold that a plaintiff seeking to protect its trade dress in a line of 
products must articulate the design elements that compose the trade dress.”); 
Heller Inc. v. Design Within Reach, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 1909 (JGK), 2009 WL 
2486054, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2009) (“The plaintiff alleges that because ‘a 
picture is worth a thousand words,’ the images ‘without a doubt provide the most 
precise definition of the protected trade dress possible.’ However, images alone 
do not satisfy the plaintiff’s obligation to articulate the distinctive features of the 
trade dress.”); Nat’l Lighting Co. v. Bridge Metal Indus., LLC, 601 F. Supp. 2d 
556, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that the court could not be expected to distill 
from a set of images those elements that are common to a line of products and 
both distinctive and non–functional). 
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Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co.,45 the Second 
Circuit rejected as too abstract a description of site furniture that 
“incorporates large three-inch tubing, with a powdered cosmetic 
finish, bent in gentle turns that roll around the perimeter of the 
furniture which in combination with the various seating surfaces 
gives the viewer a floating or suspended feeling.”46 Meanwhile in 
the famous Two Pesos case,47 the court accepted this description:  
 
a festive eating atmosphere having interior dining 
and patio areas decorated with artifacts, bright 
colors, paintings and murals. The patio includes 
interior and exterior areas with the interior patio 
capable of being sealed off from the outside patio by 
overhead garage doors. The stepped exterior of the 
building is a festive and vivid color scheme using top 
border paint and neon stripes. Bright awnings and 
umbrellas continue the theme.48 
 
The verbal description requirement does constrain parties’ 
claiming in some cases, because a party that claims too broadly risks 
describing a trade dress for which it will have trouble satisfying 
trademark law’s protectability requirements of distinctiveness49 or 
nonfunctionality.50 At the extreme, courts sometimes do not even 
recognize vague or underspecified claims as describing trade dress 
at all.51 But because courts are often reluctant to invalidate, they will 
                                                                                                             
45 113 F.3d 373 (2d Cir. 1997). 
46 Id. at 381. 
47 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
48 Id. at 765. 
49 See Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 39–45 
(1st Cir. 2001). 
50 See Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., Inc., 916 
F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Wallace seeks trademark protection, not for a precise 
expression of a decorative style, but for basic elements of a style that is part of the 
public domain. As found by the district court, these elements are important to 
competition in the silverware market.”).  
51 See, e.g., Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. State Farm Lloyds, 791 F.3d 
561, 566–67 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding that plaintiff failed to assert a trade dress 
infringement claim despite allegations that defendant created a “confusingly 
similar web site” because the “alleged confusion . . . stems from the use of a 
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typically narrow the claims or try to define the rights appropriately 
themselves,52 so there is often little downside to claiming broadly 
and strategically. 
Take the example of another recently filed case in which Lisa 
Frank, a company that makes various school supplies, stickers, and 
other products for kids, sued Orb Factory, which sells similar 
products under its Plushcraft mark.53 A representative sampling of 
Lisa Frank’s products look like this: 
 
 
Figure 7: Images of Lisa Frank’s Products.  
 
Compare these samples to the extraordinarily broad way Lisa 
Frank described its trade dress in its complaint: 
 
the combination of some or all of the following 
elements, depending upon the product and its 
packaging, that create a unique overall image and 
distinct visual impression . . . (1) brightly colored 
                                                                                                             
similar service mark (‘Testmasters‘), and the false representation that TES offers 
a similar service (live LSAT courses offered nationwide)”); Fair Wind Sailing, 
Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 309–11 (3d Cir. 2014) (dismissing the plaintiff’s 
claim for trade dress infringement when it had claimed only (1) “a hodgepodge of 
unconnected pieces of its businesses,” which did not “together . . . comprise any 
sort of composite visual effect” and (2) “web design,” without further specificity). 
52 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 25, at 2224–2266 (reviewing 
doctrines in copyright, trademark, and patent law developed to address issues of 
scope). 
53 Lisa Frank, Inc. v. Orb Factory Ltd., No. 15–cv–00433, at *8 (D. Ariz. 
Sept. 16, 2015). 
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bold graphics of distinctive animal characters 
depicted individually or grouped with one or more 
other such characters, with rainbow colored features, 
large eyes, and happy, friendly expressions; (2) use 
of brilliant, often rainbow sequenced, colors, 
graduated color sequences, and rainbow colors that 
fade into one another . . .; (3) package, cover and 
product surface designs featuring, in addition to the 
distinctive animal characters, combinations of 
rainbows, flowers, ice cream cones, butterflies, birds, 
rabbits, fish, cupcakes, bubbles, peace symbols, 
random words, hearts, happy faces, and stars, often 
in groups including colorful backgrounds employing 
rainbow colors, color fades and Lisa Frank pink, 
props and landscape features such as trees, pools, and 
snow; and (4) product packaging incorporating the 
look and feel of the products.54 
 
Not incidentally, the Orb Factory products to which Lisa Frank 





Figure 8: Images of Orb Factory’s Allegedly Infringing 
Products.  
 
As a result of this generality problem, the descriptions trade 
dress plaintiffs give frequently fail to provide significant notice. 
Perhaps more importantly, courts do not tend to structure the 
                                                                                                             
54 Id. at *5. 
55 Id. at *9. 
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validity phase of the case in order to identify the particular aspects 
of the complex design to which source designation is attributable—
which, to foreshadow a bit, makes it very hard to enforce anything 
about the scope of the rights.56 
There is some incentive to claim clearly non-functional aspects 
of trade dress as courts increasingly interpret the Supreme Court’s 
TrafFix decision to require a finding of functionality whenever the 
claimed features are not “ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary”57—
that is to say, not entirely unrelated to function.58 But that’s only true 
in cases where courts recognize the utilitarian functionality of some 
of the claimed features, and the level of generality of the claim has 
much to say about whether that will happen. 
As a result, in comparison to design patent, claims in trademark 
law are anchored by a party’s actual use, supplemented formally and 
necessarily by verbal description.59 In practice, however, these 
claims don’t do much to help better define the features of the trade 
dress that are protectable, and in fact sometimes obscure more than 
they illuminate.  
And of course this is only to flag problems with notice relating 
to the nature of the trade dress itself—not including issues relating 
to the contexts in which that trade dress has source significance, 
geographic scope of rights, or anything else that might be relevant 
to notice of the scope of rights.  
 
C.  Copyright 
 
Claiming in copyright has many of the same problems I’ve 
already identified: the copyrighted work serves as the exemplar, but 
it doesn’t give very much notice in many cases because the work 
                                                                                                             
56 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 25, at 2251–53. 
57 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 30 (2001). 
58 Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Intern., Inc., 730 F.3d 
494, 505 (6th Cir. 2013); Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1323 
(Fed. Cir. 2012); Specialized Seating, Inc. v. Greenwich Indus. L.P., 616 F.3d 
722, 726–28 (7th Cir. 2010); Eppendorf–Netheler–Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 
289 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2002). 
59 See Lisa Frank, Inc. v. Orb Factory Ltd., No. 15–cv–00433 at *6 (D. Ariz. 
Sept 16, 2015); see also id. at *8. 
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frequently incorporates many uncopyrightable features;60 
registration doesn’t require identification of the specific elements 
claimed;61 further delineation only occurs in litigation;62 and, in the 
context of design, copyright suffers from all the same visual/verbal 
challenges as those previously discussed.63 In some respects, these 
problems are even worse in copyright because copyright worries 
even less about claiming methodology than do design patent and 
trademark law.  
But I think it is worth noting that Star Athletica64 puts additional 
pressure on claiming in cases involving useful articles—which is to 
say, most cases of design. The most obvious claiming issue relates 
to the uncertainty about whether Varsity was claiming the design of 
various chevrons and lines by themselves, or the designs of the 
uniforms of which the chevrons were merely features. The Supreme 
Court majority accepted that Varsity claimed a two-dimensional 
design that was applied to the useful article of the cheerleading 
uniform.65 But it is hardly obvious that is so, and the correct 
understanding of Varsity’s claim seems to me to turn at least in part 
on whether we are to emphasize the visual deposit copy or the 
plaintiff’s characterization of that design. 
  
                                                                                                             
60 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 25, at 2227 (“[I]n general, copyright 
law only rarely disqualifies works altogether and instead generally relies on 
infringement doctrine to limit the scope of rights in a work so that it reflects that 
work’s marginal copyrightability.”); Fromer, supra note 6, at 745.  
61 Copyright Basics, UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, (last visited Jun. 
15, 2017), available at https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ01.pdf#page=7. 
62 Fromer, supra note 6, at 746. 
63 For discussions of the difficulties courts have in evaluating nonwritten 
works in IP, see, for example, Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The 
Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683 (2012); Jessica Silbey, Evidence 
Verité and the Law of Film, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1257 (2010); Jessica M. Silbey, 
Judges as Film Critics: New Approaches to Filmic Evidence, 37 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 493 (2004). 
64 Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017). 
65 Id. at 1008. 
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As Justice Breyer suggested, look at the designs Varsity 
registered:66  
 
Figure 9: Image Comparison of Varsity’s Registered Designs.67 
 
The majority’s characterization of these as drawings of various 
features in some arrangement68 ignores the reality of the images 
submitted to the Copyright Office. They are not simply depictions 
of chevrons—they are pictures of uniforms that have particular 
design features. But registration does not require a clear statement 
on this score.  
To complicate matters further, the same visual image could 
reflect two different types of claims. One might, for example, make 
a model of a car and submit an image of that model to claim rights 
in the model of the car. As Justice Thomas noted, the model of the 
car is copyrightable, even if it cannot be enforced against a party 
that makes an actual car.69 Yet one could also characterize an image 
of a car in the same way Varsity described its uniforms in order to 
claim design features that might be—in the majority’s language—
                                                                                                             
66 Id. at 1036 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
67 Id. at 1016 (appendix to the opinion of the court). 
68 Id. at 1008–09 (“In this case, our task is to determine whether the 
arrangements of lines, chevrons, and colorful shapes appearing on the surface of 
respondents' cheerleading uniforms are eligible for copyright protection as 
separable features of the design of those cheerleading uniforms.”). 
69 Id. at 1010. 
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“applied to” the car itself.70 The very same sorts of images could be 
used to lay claim to a particular depiction of a car, but not a car, or 
to features of an actual car, at least as long as those features could 
be “imagined” separately from the car.71 That might be acceptable 
if ordinarily the copyright registration process forced a party to 
delineate its claim – identifying which features of the submitted 
work it claimed, and for what purpose. But typically, the Copyright 
Office does not require anything like that, and the claim will be 
defined, if at all, in litigation.  
That brings me to the second issue. The majority opinion makes 
separability turn on whether features of a useful article can be 
imagined separately as a work of authorship that is not itself a useful 
article.72 But what features are we to “imagine” separately, and how 
do we know whether those features can be recognized as a work of 
authorship or, alternatively, simply depict the useful article?  
The majority isn’t very clear on either one of those things, 
having simply accepted that the features in that case were a series of 
chevrons and other lines arranged in some format. But actually the 
question must turn on which features the plaintiff claims should be 
imagined separately. Here we see a problem very much like the 
others we’ve seen in other contexts.   
At various points during the litigation, Varsity verbally 
described the aspects of this design it thought were copyrightable: 
“the lines, stripes, coloring, angles, V’s [or chevrons], and shapes 
and the arrangement and placement of those elements.”73 Courts at 
every level of the litigation basically accepted that description, 
similarly characterizing Varsity’s copyright claim as relating to 
“graphic features of Varsity’s designs—the arrangement of stripes, 
                                                                                                             
70 Id. at 1005. 
71 Id. at 1012 (“In sum, a feature of the design of a useful article is eligible 
for copyright if, when identified and imagined apart from the useful article, it 
would qualify as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work either on its own or when 
fixed in some other tangible medium.”). 
72 Id. at 1010. 
73 Id. at 1018 (emphasizing “the lines, stripes, coloring, angles, V’s and 
shapes and the arrangement and placement of those elements”); cf. id. at 1007 
(referring to all five designs as “compris[ing] original combinations, positionings, 
and arrangements of elements which include V’s (chevrons), lines, curves, stripes, 
angles, diagonals, inverted V’s, coloring, and shapes, etc.”). 
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chevrons, zigzags, and color-blocking.”74 
But when Varsity needed to describe the designs to the 
Copyright Office in order to overcome the Office’s initial rejection, 
its description was much more specific:  
 
Design 538 . . . has a central field of black bordered 
at the bottom by a gray/white/black multistripe 
forming a shallow “vee” of which the left-hand leg is 
horizontal, while the right-hand leg stretches 
“northeast” at approximately a forty-five degree 
angle. Below the upward-angled leg of the shallow 
“vee” is a similarly angled wider white stripe, 
succeeded by an area of black. The central field of 
black is bordered on top by an “X” figure formed of 
the same gray/white/black multistripe that appears at 
the bottom, with the colors reversed. Above the “X” 
is a field of white; the wedges at either side of the 
“X” are subdivided horizontally into approximately 
equal-sized wedges of black over white.75 
 
The descriptions are likely to matter in a lot of these cases, 
because at different levels of generality the purportedly separable 
features are going to look more like works of authorship that could 
be imagined apart—or more like representations of the platonic 
form of the useful article.  
The majority waves its hand at this issue, simply asserting in a 
footnote that no features of a shovel could be imagined separately, 
because they would just represent a shovel.76 But, in my view, 
Justice Breyer is obviously correct that, given the low standard of 
                                                                                                             
74 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 491 (6th Cir. 
2015). 
75 Joint Appendix at *140, Varsity Brands, 2016 WL 3924018. Chances are 
that Varsity intended this very granular claiming strategically to convince the 
Copyright Office to register something that might otherwise have been seen as 
lacking authorship or originality, possibly for being a useful article as clothing. 
By being very granular about its contribution, Varsity (probably correctly) 
thought the Copyright Office was more likely to acknowledge an original and 
copyrightable contribution. 
76 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1002 n.2. 
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originality, any feature of a shovel described with sufficient 
particularity could be “imagined” as a separate work, at least unless 
we are to layer the analysis with some determination of whether 
those features, standing alone, necessarily “bring along” the useful 
article.77  
All of that is to say that I think Star Athletica is going to put lots 
of pressure on courts to start thinking more about claiming 




The second major dimension I want to address is the problem of 
determining the scope of admittedly valid rights. Obviously, the 
difficulty of nailing down scope is, in some significant part, the 
result of a lack of clarity about what is claimed. Indeed, the claiming 
problems I identified before can allow parties to act strategically, 
sometimes even within a case, emphasizing some aspects of a design 
for some purposes (validity) and other aspects for other purposes 
(infringement).  
But the difficulty of identifying the boundaries of the claimed 
property then combines with challenges in delineating the penumbra 
of rights associated with that claim. To oversimplify this, I mean to 
say that there are two levels of difficulty in doing the comparison 
between the accused product and the claimed design. The first is 
figuring out what the claimed design is, so that we know to what we 
are supposed to compare the accused product. The second is 
determining how broadly we will enforce rights in that claimed 
design—how far beyond identity will we go.  
The identification of the claimed property is supposed to be an 
input into a validity determination; we analyze the validity of the 
claimed design, trade dress, or work. As I noted earlier, every area 
of IP allows parties to claim rights in works or inventions that are 
only marginally protectable – they all allow protection for works 
that consist in some substantial part of components which, by 
themselves and sometimes even in particular combinations, would 
not be protectable.  
                                                                                                             
77 Id. at 1033. (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
78 Portions of this section are adapted from Lemley & McKenna, supra note 
25.  
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But our willingness to protect those works or inventions despite 
their many unprotectable parts is supposed to be counterbalanced by 
a recognition that the scope of rights in them is correspondingly 
narrow. That is to say that there’s an institutional design choice with 
respect to how to treat complex works with many unprotectable 
parts. We could aggressively disqualify them from protection 
because of the unprotectable elements, thereby saving ourselves a 
lot of concern about tailoring protection but also eliminating a 
number of things that have at least some marginally inventive, 
original, or source-indicating matter. Or we could let most of those 
works qualify for protection in recognition of their marginal 
contribution, but then have to deal with the consequences of that 
approach when we evaluate infringement.  
With the exception of utilitarian functionality in trademark 
law—at least as applied in most courts—IP law has chosen the latter 
approach.79 Concerned about underprotecting even marginal 
contributions, we rarely rule things out categorically and instead put 
all of the pressure on scope. But it turns out that, as Mark Lemley 
and I have described, courts often have a difficult time making good 
on the promise of narrow scope.80  
Take, for example, Reynolds Consumer Products v. Handi-Foil 
Corp.81 In that case, Reynolds objected to the packaging of a new 
line of Handi-Foil aluminum foil products. Reynolds claimed to own 
rights in the “overall look, feel and commercial impression of its 
Reynolds Wrap packaging design,” which it described as consisting 
of: 
(a) the color scheme; (b) the use of the color scheme; (c) the 
use of prominent lettering within the blue section; (d) the use 
of silver bands to separate the blue and pink sections; (e) the 
placement of the quantity information; (f) the inclusion of 
the “made in the U.S.A.” lettering; (g) the repetition of the 
color scheme and type on the ends of the boxes; (h) the 
“press here to lock” feature at the ends of the boxes; (i) the 
use of graphics with how-to information; (j) the “Lift” 
                                                                                                             
79 See generally, Lemley & McKenna, supra note 25. 
80 Id. 
81 See Reynolds Consumer Prods., Inc. v. Handi-Foil Corp., No. 1:13–CV–
214, 2014 WL 3615853 (E.D. Va. July 18, 2014). 
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graphic; (k) the positioning of the brand name on the top flap 
of the box; and (l) the color yellow, placement, and text used 
to caution the consumer.82 
 
Though the court noted that trade dress with more elements is 
supposed to have narrower scope, it never addressed validity or 
attempted to identify the features that made the Reynolds trade dress 
protectable. It simply compared Handi-Foil’s and Reynolds’s 
packages and concluded that “the similarity between the overall 
impressions” was “striking.”83 
Figure 10: Image Comparison of Plaintiff’s Reynolds Wrap and 
Defendant’s Handi-Foil.84 
 
In fact, the court thought the similarities between the two 
packaging designs were striking “even if the boxes’ color schemes 
[were] put aside.”85 What were the damning similarities?  
The two boxes both say “non-stick” and “heavy duty.” The 
Reynolds box says “foods lift right off!” and the Handi-Foil 
box says “Food Easily Lifts Off!” Both boxes place the 
(identical) square footage on the right end of the box, with 
the metric conversions typed neatly below. Additionally, the 
two-dimensional images above cannot capture the similarity 
of the boxes’ side and end panels, all of which bear striking 
semblance. Add to these characteristics the “Made in USA” 
language on the right portion of the boxes in Example No. 
1.86 
 
                                                                                                             
82 Id. at *11. 
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The obvious problem here is that the elements of similarity 
called out by the court were not even elements of the trade dress 
articulated by Reynolds, very likely because those elements almost 
certainly were not things Reynolds was entitled to own. Phrases like 
“Food Easily Lifts Off” and “Made in the USA” are clearly 
descriptive, so any rights Reynolds owned in relation to the phrases 
must have been related to the particular stylization—which Handi-
Foil did not copy. When one limits the trade dress in the Reynolds 
Wrap packaging to only the sorts of things Reynolds is legally 
entitled to own, the similarities disappear.  
These scope challenges are to some extent a consequence of the 
infringement tests themselves. Having moved away from the point 
of novelty test, for example, courts in design patent cases no longer 
highlight the protectable features, simply asking factfinders to 
compare the accused design to the claimed design “in light of the 
prior art,”87 which can allow for slippage between validity and 
infringement assessments. We see a similar result in the Reynolds 
case. 
But there is also a major structural dimension to the problem. 
Notwithstanding the interconnectedness of the various scope 
questions courts must address, those questions arise in different 
parts of the tripartite case structure typically associated with IP 
cases: validity, infringement, defenses. The result of this separation 
is a number of disconnects—circumstances in which the law should 
reach a consistent scope result but fails to do so because each IP 
doctrine assumes that others will take care of the problem. First, 
different decisionmakers decide different doctrines, often at 
different times. Judges and juries sometimes have fundamentally 
different approaches to similar questions, and the gaps are even 
more likely when the jury hears only part of the story because the 
judge has already decided other parts. Second, even if the 
decisionmaker is the same, validity, infringement, and defenses 
often come with different burdens of proof and different allocations 
of those burdens. For example, registered IP rights are all presumed 
                                                                                                             
87 See, e.g., Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 676 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (“When the differences between the claimed and accused design are viewed 
in light of the prior art, the attention of the hypothetical ordinary observer will be 
drawn to those aspects of the claimed design that differ from the prior art.”). 
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valid when challenged in court; the standard of proof differs from a 
preponderance of the evidence in copyright and trademark cases to 
clear and convincing evidence in patent and design patent cases.88 
Proving infringement is the IP owner’s burden, always by a 
preponderance of the evidence; proving a defense is a defendant’s 
burden, and again the level of proof required may differ by doctrine 
and defense.89 Third, courts and juries are often reluctant to 
invalidate IP rights.90 When validity and infringement are separated, 
the reluctance of courts to invalidate an IP right altogether means 
that they find it hard to reach the right result when the tools for 
limiting the right are classed as invalidity or general defenses rather 
than infringement doctrines or conduct-specific defenses. When, for 
example, courts understand aesthetic functionality as an all-or-
nothing validity doctrine, they are reluctant to use it in individual 
cases in which that particular defendant has a strong competitive 
need to use the feature, even if others wouldn’t have the same 
need.91   
All of these problems exist even if no one tries to exploit these 
gaps. They are inherent disconnects between the rules of validity, 
infringement, and defenses. But parties inevitably seek to exploit 
them for their own advantage, often by trying to separate the 
determination of validity from the determination of infringement, 
either by having them done at separate times or by different 
decisionmakers. Whenever the two are separated, IP owners argue 
in the validity context that the rights are quite narrow and therefore 
valid, but then turn around in the infringement context and 
emphasize the breadth of their rights. Accused infringers do the 
reverse. 
                                                                                                             
88 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 25, at 2222–23. 
89 Id. at 2221 n.88 (“Inequitable conduct in patent law, for instance, requires 
proof by the defendant by clear and convincing evidence . . . Most other defenses 
require a defendant to show only a preponderance of the evidence.”); see also 
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287–1291 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (en banc).  
90 See Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 71, 103 (2013) (arguing that courts are often too willing to 
resolve cases on infringement grounds even when the IP right should be invalid). 
91 See, e.g., Au–Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 
1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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Utility patent law tries to limit that strategic behavior, and to 
eliminate the gaps between validity and infringement, by use of a 
Markman hearing.92 There are, of course, plenty of concerns about 
the way Markman hearings are actually used,93 but they have one 
significant virtue: they put the scope question front and center and 
settle on the scope of the right once and for all—a claim scope that 
then is held constant for validity and infringement purposes.  
We lack a similar mechanism for constraining strategic behavior 
in other areas of IP, even though we should have all the same 
concerns about that outside of utility patent law.  
 
III. COSTS OF DIFFICULTIES WITH CLAIMING AND SCOPE 
 
Some of the costs associated with difficulties identifying the 
claimed subject matter and delineating the scope of a party’s rights 
are pretty obvious. They generally make it more difficult for parties 
to determine what others own, either so that they can steer clear of 
the protected matter or seek a license, if it’s a setting in which 
licensing would be possible. That means we are likely to have 
inefficiencies in multiple directions: risk-averse licensing when 
licenses are not needed, and inefficient designing around when 
copying would have been legitimate or, perhaps, when there was a 
deal to be had.  
Another type of cost persists even when there has been a 
licensing relationship. Licenses very commonly refer to legally 
defined rights when identifying the subject of the license—referring 
to particular design patents or to trade dress, for example. To the 
extent such a reference to legally-defined subject matter imports 
ambiguity regarding the boundaries of the licensed matter, parties 
may wind up fighting over whether conduct violates a license even 
when they mean to abide by it. I’ll just use one example here, namely 
the case of Premium Balloon Accessories, Inc. v. Creative Balloons 
Mfg., Inc.94  
Premium and Creative both made balloon accessories, including 
balloon weights, which are objects that weigh down helium balloons 
                                                                                                             
92 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384–87 (1996). 
93 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 25, at 2269–71. 
94 573 F. App’x. 547 (6th Cir. 2014). 
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so they don't fly away.95 Premium had previously sued Creative, 
alleging that Creative's balloon weights infringed Premium's trade-
dress rights in four of its balloon weights, including a star-shaped 
weight. The parties entered into a settlement agreement under which 
Creative agreed to pay Premium for “a fully paid-up license under 
the trade dress that was the subject of the Complaint.”96 Soon after 
the agreement was signed, Premium began manufacturing a new 
star-shaped “Heavy Weight” balloon weight, which was similar in 
appearance to the star-shaped weight that it already sold except that 
it was thicker and heavier.97 In 2009, Creative introduced a similar 
weight to the market, calling it the “SuperStar” balloon weight.98 
You can see what’s coming here—Premium sued Creative for 
infringing the trade dress of its new star-shaped Heavy Weight.99 
Creative argued that it had a license to use Premium's design under 
the previous settlement agreement, and that the new design was 
similar enough to the old design to be covered under that license 
agreement.100  
The Sixth Circuit ultimately agreed with Creative that it had a 
license to use Premium's trade dress in certain balloon weight 
products, including its lighter star-shaped weight, and that the new 
star-shaped Heavy Weight used essentially the same trade dress as 
the star-shaped weight the design of which Creative licensed, albeit 
with minor, primarily functional modifications, such as for size and 
weight.101  
But the parties had to litigate this case to the Sixth Circuit to 
understand the scope of the design rights reflected in the license. 
Indeed, the District Court had concluded that Creative’s new design 
was not the same as the old design and so wasn’t covered by a 
license that referred to the previous star-shaped weight.102 The 
dispute was entirely about the scope of the trade dress subject to the 
license. Everyone recognized it wasn’t limited to the exact shape 
                                                                                                             






101 Id. at 549. 
102 Premium Balloon Accessories, Inc. v. Creative Balloons Mfg., Inc., No. 
1:10CV979, 2013 WL 3947191 (N.D. Ohio July 31, 2013). 
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previously used, but the scope of the design covered by the license 
was unclear, leaving the court with two difficult questions: (1) was 
Creative’s weight sufficiently different from the designs under the 
license such that the new weight was not covered by the license?; 
and (2) was the new weight also sufficiently similar to Premium’s 
new trade dress—which was very similar to its previous design—
such that it could be considered infringing?  
Let me finish by returning to something I said early on—these 
claiming issues create enough scope problems even if we just think 
about each of these areas of law in isolation. But it would be a 
mistake only to consider them in isolation, because it is so common 
for parties to assert multiple forms of rights with respect to the same 
design. 
Take, for example, Deckers’s case against H&M.103 In that case, 
Deckers alleged that H&M infringed a design patent covering 





Figure 11: Image Comparison of Allegedly Infringing Product and 
Design Patent D599,999.  
 
Deckers also claimed that H&M infringed its trade dress rights 
in the Bailey Boot, which it described as follows: 
• Classic suede boot styling made famous by the 
UGG® Brand; 
                                                                                                             
103 Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. H&M Hennes & Maurtiz, L.P., No. 2:17–cv–
00103. (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2017). 
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• Overlapping of front and rear panels on lateral side 
of the boot shaft; 
• Curved top edges on the overlapping panels; 
• Exposed fleece-type lining edging the overlapping 
panels and top of the boot shaft; and 
• One or more buttons (depending on the height of the 
boot) prominently featured on the lateral side of the 
boot shaft adjacent the overlapping panels.104  
 
That is to say that Deckers asserted that the same H&M boots 
infringed both the design patent and the trade dress.105 Indeed, it 
lined them all up side by side in the complaint:  
 
Figure 12: Image Comparison of Defendant’s Allegedly Infringing 
Products and Deckers’s Bailey Button Boot and Design Patent 
D599,999.  
 
Here’s the piece I want to highlight: the design patent and the 
trade dress refer, ostensibly, to the same design, but there are some 
interesting and notable differences in the claims. In some ways, the 
trade dress claim is obviously broader than the patented design, 
referring for example to “one or more buttons.”106 That is, the trade 
dress claim is really to a line of boots, not to a particular boot 
design—boots of multiple different numbers of buttons and of 
different heights. The trade dress claim is also conceivably narrower 
in the sense that it refers to a fleece-type lining, whereas the design 
patent clearly depicts some kind of lining but doesn’t denote a 
                                                                                                             
104 Id. at *4. 
105 Id. at *4–5. 
106 Id. at *5. 
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material.107  To figure out what it could and couldn’t do, H&M 
would have needed to layer both of those claims on top of each other 




The problems I’ve discussed here strongly indicate the need to 
put the scope question front and center in litigation, both 
conceptually and structurally. That will necessarily require that we 
think much more about claiming methodology in design patent, 
trademark, and copyright law. I certainly don’t mean to suggest that 
we would simply want to take everything that utility patent law has 
done with respect to claim interpretation and import it into other 
areas. Obviously, there are plenty of concerns about claim 
construction methodology even in utility patent—though notably 
some significant part of that has to do with utility patent law’s 
emphasis on language rather than on the actual invention,108 a sort 
of analogous problem to the one I’ve described. We might also have 
good reasons to want to do interpretation differently in other areas 
of IP. But far too much of the law dealing with claiming and scope 
is being done implicitly and inconsistently now, and we would be 
better off if that changed.  
Finally, I think these concerns ought to make us more 
uncomfortable with the extent of overlapping protection in this 
context. I have been on record elsewhere arguing for greater 
channeling generally in IP law.109 But the reason overlap is 
particularly problematic here is that the variation in claim 
interpretation and scope determinations across different areas of IP 
can create significant uncertainty and opportunity for strategic 
manipulation. That is an especially significant concern now, since 
                                                                                                             
107 See id. at *8.  
108 See generally, Burk & Lemley, supra note 5; see also, Fromer, supra 
note 6, at 758. 
109 See Mark P. McKenna & Christopher Jon Sprigman, What's in, and 
What's Out: How IP's Boundary Rules Shape Innovation, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
491 (2017); McKenna & Strandburg, supra note 9; Mark P. McKenna, 
(Dys)functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 823 (2011); Mark P. McKenna, An Alternate 
Approach to Channeling?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 873 (2009).  
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the majority opinion in Star Athletica essentially dismissed concerns 
about overlap, embracing the possibility of overlapping copyright 
and design patent protection for design.110 To my mind, that would 
be an unwelcome development that would further exacerbate the 
problems I’ve identified here. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
110 See Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1015 
(2017) (“[W]e have long held that design patent and copyright are not mutually 
exclusive.”) 
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